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Abstract. Recently, Liu et al. [Commun. Theor. Phys. 57, 583, 2012] proposed a
quantum private comparison protocol based on entanglement swapping of Bell states,
which aims to securely compare the equality of two participants’ information with
the help of a semi-honest third party (TP). However, this study points out there is a
fatal loophole in this protocol, i.e., TP can obtain all of the two participants secret
inputs without being detected through making a specific Bell-basis measurement. To
fix the problem, a simple solution, which uses one-time eavesdropper checking with
decoy photons instead of twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states, is demonstrated.
Compared with the original protocol, it also reduces the Bell states consumption and
simplifies the steps in the protocol.
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1. Introduction
Since Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed the first quantum key distribution protocol
in 1984, various quantum cryptography protocols have been flourished by utilizing
quantum mechanics principles, including quantum secret sharing (QSS) [2-4], quantum
key distribution (QKD) [5-7], quantum teleportation [8, 9] and quantum direct
communication (QDC) [10-13], etc. The main purpose is to provide unconditionally
secure information exchange on basis of the law of quantum mechanics.
As a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography, secure multiparty
computation (SMC) has been a research hotspot in classical cryptography. It originated
in the millionaire problem introduced by Yao [14], in which two millionaires hope
to determine who is richer without revealing the precise amount of their fortunes.
As a first step to solve the millionaire problem, private comparison of equality was
proposed by Boudot et al. [15] to compare the equality of two millionaires’ property,
without disclosing any actual information. However, the security of SMC is based on
the computational complexity assumptions, so it may be seriously threatened by the
powerful quantum computer. Fortunately, quantum cryptography, which is regarded as
one of the most promising applications of quantum mechanics, is able to guarantee the
unconditional security of the information.
As the quantum counterpart of private comparison of equality, quantum private
comparison of equality (QPCE) has become an important branch of quantum
cryptography. QPCE allows two participants to privately compare the equality of their
secret information based on the properties of quantum mechanics, without disclosing any
information about their secrets. However, Lo [16] pointed out that the equality function
cannot be securely evaluated by two-party protocol in quantum scenario. Therefore, an
additional condition with a third party (TP) is necessary to reach the goal of private
comparison. The pioneering QPCE protocol was proposed by Yang et al. [17] in 2009, in
which a one-way hash function was used to calculate the hash values of two participants’
secret inputs firstly, and then these hash values were encoded into the photons of EPR
pairs. In essence, its security is guaranteed by the hash function. Since then, with
different categories of quantum states, many other QPCE protocols have been proposed
[18-24]. Recently, Liu et al. [25] proposed a QPCE protocol based on Bell states. In
the protocol, the characteristic of quantum entanglement swapping is utilized to realize
the comparison task, and TP is assumed as a semi-honest third party. However, while
revisiting Liu et al.’s protocol, we find that it has a fatal security loophole, i.e., TP can
obtain all of the two participants secret information without being detected through
making a specific Bell-basis measurement (we called it as TP’s measurement attack),
which is obviously against the QPCE’s requirements [26]. Furthermore, a simple and
efficient solution is given herein to eliminate this security loophole.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, Liu et al.’s protocol is
briefly reviewed. In Sect. 3, the security loophole is analyzed and an improved strategy
is given. Finally, a short conclusion is given in Sect. 4.
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2. Review of Liu et al.’s Protocol
In Ref. [25], Liu et al. proposed a QPCE protocol based on Bell states |Φ±〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉) ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉) ± |10〉). In the protocol, all the three parties need
to prepare Bell states, and the private comparison task is fulfilled by utilizing the
entanglement swapping between the Bell states of the participants’ and TP’s. The
main procedures of the protocol are as follows.
Prerequisite. Alice and Bob agree that the states |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉 represent
the information ‘00’, ‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’, respectively.
Step 1. Alice (Bob) equally divides her (his) binary representation of secret
inputs X (Y ) into ⌈L/2⌉ groups, and they are denoted by GA1 , GA2 , ..., GA⌈L/2⌉
(GB1 , G
B
2 , ..., G
B
⌈L/2⌉).
Step 2. Alice, Bob and TP prepare ⌈L/2⌉ Bell states in |Φ+〉, and take the first
(second) particle from each state to form their own sequences SA1 (S
A
2 ), S
B
1 (S
B
2 ) and
SC1 (S
C
2 ), respectively.
Step 3. Alice and TP prepare an order L
′
-length Bell states sequences in |Φ+〉
once again, which are denoted by TA′ (TC′ ) sequences, respectively. TA′ and TC′ will be
used to perform eavesdropper checking. Then Alice (TP) inserts the first and second
particles of every Bell state in sequence TA′ (TC′ ) into sequences S
A
1 (S
C
1 ) and S
A
2 (S
C
2 )
at the same positions, respectively, and get SA
′
1 (S
C
′
1 ) and S
A
′
2 (S
C
′
2 ). Afterwards, they
exchange SA
′
2 and S
C
′
2 (shown in Fig. 1a). Then Alice and TP perform the eavesdropper
checking of Alice-TP (TP-Alice) quantum channel by using the correlation of Bell states
in TA′ (TC′ ). If there is no eavesdropper, Alice and TP discard the checking particles,
and continue the next step.
Step 4. Alice performs the Bell-basis measurement on corresponding two particles
in SA1 , S
C
2 , and the measurement outcomes is denoted by M
A
j , and she calculates R
A
j in
terms of MAj . If M
A
j is |Φ+〉 (|Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉), then RAj is ‘00’(‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’). As a
result, the corresponding two particles in SC1 , S
A
2 on TP’s hand will be collapsed into
one of four Bell states (shown in Fig. 1b). The new sequences are denoted by SC
′′
1 , S
C
′′
2 .
Step 5. Bob and TP prepare another order L
′
-length Bell states sequences in |Φ+〉,
and insert them into SB1 , S
B
2 and S
C
′′
1 , S
C
′′
2 , respectively, which is same as that in Step 3.
After that, Bob and TP exchange the second particles sequence (shown in Fig. 1c), and
perform the eavesdropper checking in the same way. If the quantum channels of Bob-TP
and TP-Bob are secure, Bob and TP discard the checking particles, and continue the
next step.
Step 6. Bob performs the Bell-basis measurement on the corresponding two
particles in SB1 , S
C
′′
2 on his hand (the outcome is denoted by M
B
j ), then the
corresponding two particles in SC1 , S
A
2 will be collapsed into one of four Bell states
(shown in Fig. 1d). At the same time, TP performs the same Bell-basis measurement
on the particles in SC
′′
1 , S
B
2 , and gets the outcome M
C
j . Then, Bob (TP) can calculate
RBj (R
C
j ) in terms ofM
B
j (M
C
j ). If M
B
j (M
C
j ) is |Φ+〉 (|Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉), then RBj (RCj )
is ‘00’(‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’). For the convenience of calculation, RCj can be represented as
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Figure 1. The entanglement swapping of Bell states among the three parties in Liu
et al.’s protocol. (a) Alice and TP exchange their second particles (A2, C2) of Bell
states. (b) Particles C1 and A2 on TP’s hand become entangled together after Alice
performs the Bell-basis measurement on particles A1 and C2. (c) TP and Bob continue
to exchange particles A2 and B2. (d) Particles C1 and B2 on TP’s hand form a new
Bell entangled state after Bob performs the Bell-basis measurement on particles B1
and A2.
below, RCj = (r
C1
j r
C2
j ).
Step 7. Alice and Bob calculate Rj = (R
A
j ⊕GAj )⊕ (RBj ⊕GBj ) = (r1j r2j ) (i ≤ j ≤
⌈L/2⌉), and send the result Rj to TP. TP calculates R = ∑⌈L/2⌉j=1 ((r1j ⊕rC11 )+(r2j ⊕rC21 )).
Step 8. TP sends R to Alice and Bob, if R = 0, then X = Y ; otherwise X 6= Y .
As shown above, the eavesdropper checking of Alice-TP and TP-Bob quantum
channels are performed step by step, that means it needs to make twice eavesdropper
checking to confirm the secure of the whole quantum channels from Alice to Bob. And
in the protocol, TP is assumed to be semi-honest third party [27], who is allowed to
misbehave on its own but cannot conspire with either of two participants. So, TP can
make any attacks in the communication process as long as he does not collude with
the two participants. That is to say, TP is likely to launch the measurement attack to
obtain the participants’ secret inputs. The more details will be described in Sect. 3.
3. TP’s Measurement Attack and the Improvement
3.1. TP’s Measurement Attack on Liu et al.’s Protocol
While reexamining Liu et al.’s protocol, we find that there exists a security loophole in
it. TP could launch the measurement attack to obtain all the two participants’ secret
inputs without being detected. The detailed analysis is as follows.
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As depicted in Step 4, after Alice performs Bell-basis measurement on two particles
in SA1 , S
C
2 , the corresponding two particles on TP’s hand will be collapsed into one of
four Bell states. Then the correspondence of particles after the entanglement swapping
can be shown as below,
|Φ+〉A1A2 ⊕ |Φ+〉C1C2 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)A1A2 ⊕ (|00〉+ |11〉)C1C2
=
1
2
(|00〉A1C2 |00〉C1A2 + |01〉A1C2 |10〉C1A2
+|10〉A1C2 |01〉C1A2 + |11〉A1C2 |11〉C1A2)
=
1
2
(|Φ+〉A1C2 |Φ+〉C1A2 + |Φ−〉A1C2 |Φ−〉C1A2
+|Ψ+〉A1C2 |Ψ+〉C1A2 − |Ψ−〉A1C2 |Ψ−〉C1A2) (1)
From the above Eq. 1, we can know that there is a direct relationship between Alice’s
and TP’s Bell states, i.e., they are always the same. For example, if the outcome of Bell
measurement on the pair on TP’s hand (C1, A2) is |Φ+〉, the Bell state on Alice’s hand
(A1, C2) must be |Φ+〉. Then, TP can steal Alice’s and Bob’s secrets through the below
approach.
Suppose TP wants to steal Alice’s secrets. TP makes the Bell-basis measurement
on the particles on his hand in Step 4, and gets the outcomeMC
′
j . Since Alice’s and TP’s
Bell states are the same, TP can deduce Alice’s corresponding outcome, MAj = M
C
′
j ,
and then gets its binary value RAj . More seriously, this behavior will not be detected
since it will not affect the states on Alice’s hand. On the other hand, Alice and Bob
need to calculate Rj = E
A
j ⊕ EBj (EAj = RAj ⊕ GAj , EBj = RBj ⊕ GBj ) cooperatively in
Step 7, that means, the encrypted messages EAj , E
B
j are required to be sent through
the public channel. As we all known, the classical information transmitted through the
public channel can be arbitrarily obtained without being detected. Therefore, TP can
get EAj without being detected. In terms of E
A
j and R
A
j , TP can calculate Alice’s input
GAj = E
A
j ⊕ RAj . For j = 1 to ⌈L/2⌉, TP can easily get all of Alice’s secret inputs X .
TP can also steal Bob’s secrets. As depicted in Step 6, Bob and TP perform the Bell-
basis measurement on the corresponding two particles on their hands, respectively, which
will result in the entanglement swapping between TP and Bob. And the correspondence
of particles can be one of the following four equations,
|Φ+〉C1A2 ⊕ |Φ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Φ+〉C1B2|Φ+〉B1A2 + |Φ−〉C1B2 |Φ−〉B1A2
+|Ψ+〉C1B2 |Ψ+〉B1A2 − |Ψ−〉C1B2 |Ψ−〉B1A2) (2)
|Φ−〉C1A2 ⊕ |Φ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Φ+〉C1B2|Φ−〉B1A2 + |Φ−〉C1B2 |Φ+〉B1A2
|Ψ+〉C1B2 |Ψ−〉B1A2 + |Ψ−〉C1B2 |Ψ+〉B1A2) (3)
|Ψ+〉C1A2 ⊕ |Φ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Φ+〉C1B2 |Ψ+〉B1A2 + |Φ−〉C1B2 |Ψ−〉B1A2
+|Ψ+〉C1B2 |Φ+〉B1A2 − |Ψ−〉C1B2 |Φ−〉B1A2) (4)
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|Ψ−〉C1A2 ⊕ |Φ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Φ+〉C1B2 |Ψ−〉B1A2 + |Φ−〉C1B2 |Ψ+〉B1A2
|Ψ+〉C1B2 |Φ−〉B1A2 + |Ψ−〉C1B2 |Φ+〉B1A2) (5)
Since TP had made the Bell-basis measurement on particles C1 and A2, and got the
outcome MC
′
j , he knows his original Bell state before the entanglement swapping. That
means, TP knows the correspondence of Bell states between particles (C1, B2) and
particles (B1, A2), which is shown in one of Eqs. 2-5. Through TP’s measurement
outcome MCj in Step 6, he can deduce Bob’s corresponding result M
B
j . For example,
suppose MC
′
j is |Φ−〉 and MCj is |Ψ+〉 , TP can deduce that MBj is |Ψ−〉 in terms of
Eq. 4, and then gets RBj = 11. Since E
B
j (E
B
j = R
B
j ⊕GBj ) is sent through the classical
channel, TP can get EBj without being detected. By calculating G
B
j = E
B
j ⊕ RBj , TP
will obtain GBj . For j = 1 to ⌈L/2⌉, TP can also get all of Bob’s secret inputs Y .
3.2. The Improvement
To fix the loophole, we use the decoy photons instead of Bell states for eavesdropper
checking. What is more, we introduce one-time eavesdropper checking instead of original
twice ones in the Alice-TP and TP-Bob channels. To be specific, Step 3 and 5 in the
original protocol need to be revised as follows.
Step 3∗. Alice and TP prepare L
′
decoy photons randomly in four nonorthogonal
photon states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} to form sequences DA, DC , and insert DA, DC into SA2 ,
SC2 at random positions to get S
A∗
2 , S
C∗
2 , respectively. Then they exchange sequences
SA
∗
2 , S
C∗
2 . After receiving S
C∗
2 , Alice utilizes sequence DC to perform the eavesdropper
checking of TP-Alice quantum channel. The detailed procedures are as follows, (i) TP
informs Alice the positions and the measurement bases (MBs) of the decoy photons. (ii)
Alice performs the single-photon measurements on DC and publishes the outcomes. (iii)
TP analyzes the error rate. If the error rate is higher than the threshold they preset, he
will abort the protocol; otherwise, the TP-Alice quantum channel is secure, and Alice
discards the checking particles and continues the next step. It should be noted that
sequence SA
∗
2 remains unchanged on TP’s hand.
Step 5∗. Bob prepares L
′
-length length nonorthogonal decoy photons sequence
DB, and randomly inserts DB into S
B
2 to get S
B∗
2 , then he sends S
B∗
2 to TP. TP will
perform the eavesdropper checking of the Bob-TP channel by using the same method
as that in Step 3∗. At the same time, TP sends the intact sequence SA
∗
2 to Bob. After
receiving SA
∗
2 , Bob will make one-time eavesdropper checking of the Alice-TP and TP-
Bob channels with the help of Alice, the procedures are as follows. (i) Bob asks Alice
to tell him the positions and MBs of sequence DA. (ii) Bob uses the correct MBs to
measure DA, and publishes the outcomes. (iii)Alice analyzes the error rate, and ensures
whether the Alice-TP and TP-Bob channels are secure or not. If the quantum channels
are secure, Bob and TP discard the checking particles, and continue to the next step.
Let us examine the security of our improved protocol. Firstly, we will check
whether our protocol can resist TP’s measurement attack or not. Suppose TP wants
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to steal Alice’s secrets. Alice and TP prepare decoy photons sequences DA, DC in
Step 3∗, but Alice will not publish the positions of DA when TP receives the sequence
SA
∗
2 (S
A∗
2 = DA||SA2 ). Therefore, TP cannot properly extract SA2 from SA∗2 in Step 4, that
is to say, he cannot obtain MAj through making Bell-basis measurement. Of cause, TP
cannot get Alice’s secret inputs X . Suppose TP wants to steal Bob’s secrets, and he will
try to use the correspondence after the entanglement swapping of Bell states between
particles (C1, B2) and particles (B1, A2) to deduce Bob’s secret inputs. However, TP
cannot know the Bell states of particles (C1, A2) before this entanglement swapping,
so he can only guess MAj as one of {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} with the same probability
(i.e., 1/4). For instance, suppose the final measurement outcome of particles (C1, B2) is
|Φ−〉C1B2 in Step 6, TP tries to steal Bob’s outcome in terms of Eqs 2-5. Since TP does
not know the correct state of particles (C1, A2), he needs to take into account all the
correspondences in these four equations. That is to say, TP can guess Bob’s outcome
to be |Φ−〉B1A2 , |Φ+〉B1A2, |Ψ−〉B1A2 or |Ψ+〉B1A2 with the same probability 1/4. As a
result, TP cannot get any information about RBj , and then cannot obtain Bob’s secrets
through calculating GBj = E
B
j ⊕ RBj . In addition, Liu et al.’s proved their protocol can
resist the intercept-resend attack, the measure-resend attack and the entangle-measure
attack in Ref. [25]. Since our improvement is similar to Liu et al.’s protocol, so it can
also resist these attacks.
Since we use the decoy photons to make one-time eavesdropper checking instead
of the original twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states, the particle efficiency
has also been improved. For ensuring the checking photons is enough for performing
eavesdropper checking, we suppose the number of checking particles is the same as that
of message-encoded particles, that is, the length of checking particles L
′
= ⌈L/2⌉, and
the length of secret inputs is L = 2⌈L/2⌉. In QPCE, η = ηs/ηq is usually used to
calculate the particle efficiency, here ηs represents the number of classical bits of secret
inputs, and ηq denotes the total number of particles used in the protocol. In Liu et al.’s
protocol, TP, Alice and Bob totally generate 6×⌈L/2⌉ particles (i.e., 3⌈L/2⌉ Bell states)
to compare secret inputs (X and Y ), and 8⌈L/2⌉ particles (i.e., 4L′ Bell states) to make
eavesdroppers checking, so ηs = L, ηq = 3L+4L = 7L, and then ηLiu = L/7L ≈ 14.29%.
In our improved version, totally 6× ⌈L/2⌉ message-encoded particles (i.e., 3⌈L/2⌉ Bell
states) and 3⌈L/2⌉ checking decoy photons are utilized, so ηOur = L/4.5L ≈ 20.22%.
Obviously, our particle efficiency is high than that of Liu et al.’s protocol. One point
should be noticed, that is the particle efficiencies we calculated here are different from
Ref. [18, 28], because they did not consider the photon consumption in the eavesdropper
checking stage.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
The efficiency is one of the purposes and goals of our continuous improvement in
quantum private computation. The eavesdropper checking is taken in every step of the
particles’ transmission in many QPCE protocols (including Liu et al.’s protocol), which
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makes these protocols anfractuous and inefficient. As we all know, the action of checking
always requires the participant to have quantum devices, e.g., the qubit generating
machine, the quantum memory, or the quantum measuring machine. Considering
that these devices are expensive in the practical situation, it is unrealistic that every
participant is equipped with all these quantum devices. Compared with this step-by-
step checking, one-time checking may reduce the particles consumption and simplifies
the protocol steps. On the other hand, since decoy photons are more economic and
feasible in the practical application than other entangled states, Using decoy photons
for eavesdropper checking may be a best choice.
In this paper, we find there is a security loophole in Liu et al.’s protocol, i.e., TP
can launch the measurement attack to steal all the two participants’ secret inputs. In
order to fix the loophole, we utilize one-time eavesdropper checking with decoy photons
instead of original twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states. And the improved
protocol not only can resist TP’s measurement attack, but also gets higher particle
efficiency.
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